

The Concept of Self: Some Cognitive-Cultural Considerations Concerning its Categorization and Expression in Spanish and English

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1. Introduction: Aims and Preliminary Considerations

In this article we propose a cognitive-cultural model for the representation and derivation of linguistic expressions conveying the conceptual-semantic and conceptual-pragmatic ascription of cognitive, emotive, dispositional and behavioral attributes and traits, that is, attributes and traits related to the category Self in Spanish and English. Our main focus of interest will be the so-called folk model of phenomenological Self, as evinced in the everyday linguistic manifestations of Spanish and English speakers (with the proviso that the article lacks a contrastive angle proper). The model adopts a number of assumptions and constructs derived from cognitive anthropological and cognitive linguistic models (Johnson, 1987; D'Andrade, 1995). Thus the posited cognitive-cultural dimensions, attributes and features of Self have been derived from studies in phenomenological psychology, cognitive psychology, cultural anthropology and cognitive anthropolinguistics; to these constructs we have applied models of analysis adopted from cognitive-semantic and cognitive-cultural studies; and, finally, for the process of derivation of expressions we have adopted Levelt's Model of Speaking (1989), which distinguishes three stages: Conceptualization, Formulation and Articulation, and this model is complemented by some notional constructs from the Functional-Lexematic Model closely akin to Functional Grammar (Martín Mingorance, 1987; 1990a). In this introductory section we offer some general considerations about the semantic phenomenology and anthropology of self-categorization. In section 2 we describe some dimensions, domains, attributes and features involved in the representation of that category's cognitive-cultural schemas, and illustrate a model for the derivation and expression of such

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schemas, distinguishing between an encoding-oriented, synthetic-onomasiological approach, from a decoding-oriented, analytic-semasiological approach. Finally, in section 3 we offer some concluding remarks.

To summarize our aims, the programmatic questions to be addressed can be itemized as follows:

What categorial dimensions and parameters (schemata, attributes, features) serve as molds and vehicles for the conceptualization of properties and types of selfhood?

How are such categorizations encoded linguistically? What are some of the linguistic means to represent, refer to, and ascribe, traits, properties, and characteristics of conceptual categories of Self?

What does the way a culture talks about its members' selves (as well as other cultures' selves) tell us about the way it thinks about selfhood? In other words, what are its cognitive-cultural models of this category?

The self is a culturally-constituted category. It is generally viewed as a functional whole with a composite nature: mind, body, emotions, and personality. However, the unitary or compartmentalized functional composition of the self very much depends on the cultural psychology of a culture (Morris, 1994; Cohen, 1994), especially as regards the individualistic-collectivist distinction and its attendant analytic or holistic cognitive styles (Triandis, 1990). Again, the concept of self is contingent upon the ecological, cosmological, social and moral orders permeating the culture. The Tamils, for instance, are said to possess different kinds of bodies and personalities based on the qualities taken in from the soil at their birthplace (Lock, 1993). Likewise, in our culture, the existence of a concept such as smart is indicative of how cognition, in general, and a certain type of intelligence, in particular, is lexically conceptualized. The concept of smartness points to a certain manner of implementing a person's intellectual ability or knowledge. In reference to that particular concept, this means that defining what intelligence is in our culture reflects our understanding of how it is used and for what goals and tasks. In other words, the what is a function of the how (D'Andrade, 1989). In like manner, important social and individual consequences follow from a culture's concept of self as regards an individual and his/her social life: the gendered relations (the concepts of masculinity and femininity), socialization of children, the conception of the body, the relationship with

the natural world, the normative and moral order (do's and don't's, ought's and ought not's), etc. Phenomenologically speaking, the self is not a tangible entity, but rather an inferred abstraction from phenomenological experience. Nor is it a unitary concept, for it conjures up a composite, multi-faceted, many-layered phenomenon. Again, although universally-categorized, different cultures conceive it in different ways (Geertz, 1983; Shweder and Bourne, 1984).

Because of the intangible, composite, quasi-ineffable and relativistic nature of self, humans have developed culture-bound conceptual-linguistic categories representing its properties, attributes and traits in order to think and talk about it. Through talk people signal the pragmatic indexes of the culturally-constituted categories permeating a culture. Hence talking about the self (describing its attributes, ascribing properties and qualities to it, and evaluating it) is an index of both the subjective- and intersubjectively-constituted categories making up the mental and cultural models of a culture's members.

At the outset, a distinction must be made between the purely personal style of talking about the self and the distinct communicative style and categories of a culture's conception(s) of the self. The former possesses subjective dimensions that elude the objective or intersubjective dimension of analysis: the personal voice narrating the self may be co-terminous, but still distinct from the collective or communal voice (Miller et al, 1991). On the other hand, the way people talk about selfhood is a reflection of the way they think about it, which is another way of saying that it reflects the way people think about themselves and others. From this viewpoint, talking reflects thinking and thinking informs talking. However, thinking is not just the static product of cognition, but a process of cognitive functioning, for what we think about is intimately related to how we think. The above considerations seem to argue for an integrated treatment of language categories, cognition and action. It is for this reason that in this article we will approach the study of the linguistic categorization of self using concepts, ideas and methods from disciplines like cognitive linguistics and cognitive anthropology, which, for the last couple of decades have been attempting an integration of linguistic, conceptual and cultural knowledge, and which argue in favor of the interdependence of language, cognition, emotion and social action.

Of special importance in this paper is the concept of cultural model as used and developed by cognitive anthropologists (Holland and Quinn, 1987), who stress the fact that understanding the meaning of a term entails understanding the implicit cultural models (of language and

thought) underlying it. A cultural model is a sort of intersubjectively-shared schematic version of events in the world. Cultural models typically encode in a propositional as well as a motivational format all the information members of a culture possess that enables them to coordinate, interpret, and orient, their actions, beliefs, values, norms, etc (D'Andrade, 1987). For cognitive anthropologists, many lexical-cultural terms like marriage, anger, lie, smart, etc. are 'constituted signs', and as such, encapsulate a great deal of cultural information and locally-grounded knowledge. From this theoretically-oriented, cognitive-cultural perspective, the student may then derive a series of possible implications and applications to be used in areas such as lexicology, cultural studies, cross-cultural semantics, sociocultural pedagogical guides, and cross-cultural communication studies.

In our search for a cognitive-cultural framework of analysis for the concept of self, we should bear in mind a number of points. Firstly, although universally found in all languages and cultures, it is nevertheless a culture-bound, many-faceted category. Different cultures hold different conceptions about its nature, structure and functions, and have proposed ways of conceptualizing it, often at odds with one another. This means that we are dealing with a relativist conception of a cognitive-cultural category.

Secondly, as a non-natural kind category, its categorization is 'constituted', in the sense of Searle, 1995. Unlike natural kind sign projections, constituted sign projections are the conventionalized creation of a culture. Constituted signs can be defined by means of the following formula: "X counts as Y under conditions C". Constituted signs are an attractive area for the linguist interested in the study of cultural models in language and thought. Words and expressions used by people to describe and ascribe personal cognitive, emotive and evaluative traits or properties to themselves or other selves may reflect/encode general tendencies of the human cognitive-perceptive-evaluative categorization system as well as particular, culture-bound ones (cfr. Wierzbicka, 1992). As a constituted sign, the categorization of selfhood may encode or reflect some general or even universal properties, but most saliently, it is likely to display the particular way in which a given people or culture conceives of it. There is no question that each culture possesses a distinctive concept of self, one that only partially overlaps with another culture's. The degree of overlap is likely to be the result of a host of historical, social, and psychological causes. By and large, cultures with a common axiological and historical tradition are likely to share most of their concept of self. Religion, history,

social evolution, and the like are factors underlying the weaving together of the different threads necessary for creating the tapestry of as complex a term as that of selfhood. The complexity of this term may be made manifest at different levels, for its categorization reflects and encodes various systems of parameters or dimensions.

Thirdly, it is important to specify at which level of language experience our categorial analysis is to be framed. We may in principle distinguish between the following models of self:

Reflexive models, which are for the most part encapsulated in the views passed down to us by the great religious and philosophical traditions since Antiquity;

Expert models, which seek to provide us with a scientific or principled account of man's nature, as offered by the fields of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy;

Folk models, which convey the phenomenologically-based, tradition-bound, commonsense view that we find encapsulated in the way members of a given culture talk about persons.

Our concern here will be nearly exclusively with folk models.

Fourthly, talk of self, whether from an expert model's or a folk model's perspective, often requires the operation of conceptual mapping and analogical reasoning. Common cognitive-linguistic devices for supporting the process of identifying, referring to or ascribing properties and attributes of self are:

- a) Image-schematic projections
- b) Ontological and structural projections
- c) Cultural models

These projections and models may be found in all types of linguistic manifestation, from words to discourse. Here, we will be concerned mostly with grammatical and lexical-grammatical expressions. As an example of these, consider the following Spanish expressions:

- (1) Es un cara. [lit. S/he is a face (= S/he has nerve.)]
- (2) Está fuera de sí. [S/he is out of him/herself (= S/he is very angry.)]
- (3) Está en una nube. [S/he is up on a cloud (= S/he is elated.)]
- (4) Está hundido. [S/he is sunk (= S/he is depressed.)]
- (5) Le salió del alma [It came out of his/her soul (= S/he spoke from the heart.)]

- (6) Tiene buen corazón [S/he has good heart. (= S/he is good-hearted.)]
- (7) Tiene duende [S/he has elf. (= S/he has a certain magic.)]
- (8) Dime con quién andas y te diré quién eres. [Tell me who you are going with, and I will tell you who you are (= A man is known by the company he keeps.)]

We can initially identify in these expressions a number of semantic-conceptual and semantic-structural constructs (inessive attributive predications, possessive predications, idiomatic proverbial expressions) involving metonymic and metaphoric conceptual projections (spatial and orientation metaphors of containment and verticality, as well as ontological and event metaphors) intended to convey ascriptions and evaluations of self: emotive states, states of mind, moral evaluations, behavioral dispositions, etc. These examples are meant to show some of the different ways of expressing the concept of self in Spanish in comparison to English, and hence of conceptualizing it cognitively-culturally. Thus such linguistic conceptualizations point to various mental and cultural models of self in Spanish and English. Obviously, this linguistic folk view of the self does not exist in a conceptual vacuum since it constitutes the repository of the cultural experience of a people. As such, it is a construction of a people, i.e. a cultural-conceptual projection. The fact that this projection is also an accumulated, socio-historical phenomenon signifies that it is nourished by ancestral practices (mythologies, folklore), reflexive practices (religion, ethical and moral practices), ecological, historical and social factors, plus a host of other causes whose elucidation would call for an in-depth cultural-semiotic monographic treatment.

2. Representation and Derivation of Dimensions, Parameters, Attributes and Features

Our aim in this section is twofold:

(i) to describe a model of representation of the dimensions, parameters, attributes and features of the cultural-cognitive categorization of self, as inductively inferred from its linguistic encodings (words, expressions, idioms, proverbs, and discourse); and as deductively imposed from cognitive-anthropological, and cognitive-semantic considerations.

(ii) to exemplify a model of derivation of expressions conveying the posited cognitive-cultural dimensions or parameters of the model.

Thus, methodologically speaking, we combine an inductive and a deductive approach: elicitation and collection of samples of data with a view towards identifying a set of inferred cognitive-cultural dimensions and parameters underlying the data; and the application of deduced conceptual dimensions and parameters to samples of data.

2.1. A Model of Representation

W. Levelt (1989) has proposed a now classical Speaking Model roughly comprising the following components: (a) Conceptualizer; (b) Formulator; (c) Articulator. We have adapted this model as a starting point for our own model of representation and derivation of self-categorization. Leaving aside as irrelevant the articulatory component, in our adaptation the function served by the conceptualizer component is that of a repository of explicit/implicit verbal and episodic memory (word-knowledge and world-knowledge). We leave aside the issue of the representational and procedural properties of this memory system, but we assume that it roughly consists of networks of schemas (both image and propositional schemata) making up subjective and intersubjective mental and cultural models with epistemic-representational and psycho-emotive (motivational) force. For the purpose of this article, we have recast Levelt's conceptualizer component into a series of cognitive-pragmatic and cognitive-cultural models, which are structured in a series of parameters and dimensions representing (culture-bound prototypical) attributes, features and properties of self. But in our model the conceptualizer component is made to serve a number of further functions:

a) a cognitive-pragmatic-discursive function (ways of conceptualizing self for pragmatic purposes in the relevant interactive universe of discourse). That is, the speaker must possess representations in his/her cognitive environment of antecedent, and current information about the other selves involved in the communicative event in process, as well as about the contextual situation. At the same time, the speaker must try to convey a number of intentional meanings, for example: to refer to oneself rather than to another self; to identify the self; to assess its dispositions, traits (e.g. to praise or criticize), etc.

b) a cognitive-cultural function (ways of conceptualizing self by means of mental and cultural models in language and thought). That is, the speaker must possess schematic representations of, for example, the self as a space, or as a substance, or as a machine, etc. Provision must be

made for some of the schematic representations to be idiosyncratic, totally or partially, i.e., the result of personal meaning-construction strategies of representation.

On the other hand, the formulator component can be said to have the following functions:

- a) a propositional-predicative function (in charge of assignment of basic or complex predication formats to the conceptualizing functions);
- b) an expressive function (in charge of assignment of pre-phonological expression structures to the predicative functions).

(These formulator component functions will be largely glossed over in our discussion).

Below are itemized some examples of possible domains, dimensions, parameters, schemas and attributes, making up the cognitive-pragmatic and cognitive-cultural functions:

I. Discursive-pragmatic functions

- 1. Pragmatic descriptive/ascriptive/atributive discourse strategies: referential, indexical, diagnostic, identificative, evaluative, vocative;
- 1.1 Referential strategies: self-reference; other-reference;

II. Conceptual domains of description/adscription:

A) Dimensions of Self

- A.1. Cognition: epistemic/mental traits; states of mind; degree of consciousness/awareness, rationality,
- A.2. Affect: attitudinal/emotive/mood traits
- A.3. Dispositions: character, temperament, personality
- A.4. Behavioral traits: intelligence, imagination, performance skills
- A.5 Personal conduct: morality, manners
- A.6. Physical appearance: body, looks, stance

B) Parameters

- B.1. Positive/neutral/negative
- B.2. Normality/abnormality
- B.3. Teleology, instrumentality, mediation
- B.4. Quantification, Individuation, Partition

B.5. Prototypicality/Stereotypicality

C) Cognitive-Cultural Schemas description/ascription/attribution

C.1. Embodied schemas

C.1.1. containment/spatiality:

C.1.2. orientation: up/down

C.1.3 movement, force

C.1.4 body (head, face, eyes, mouth..)

C.1.4.1 body part as locus

C.1.4.2 body part as mediated agency

C.2. Ontological schemas

C.2.1. Material Substances,

C.2.2. Supernatural Substances: god(s), forces, spirits

C.2.3. Metaphysical substances: mind, spirit, soul

C.2.4. Nature: land, trees, animals

C.2.5. Artifacts, machines

C.3. Cognitive-Cultural schemas

C.3.1. Reflexive models: mythology, religion, philosophy

C.3.1.1. Expert models: psychology, sociology, anthropology

C.3.2. Folk models: phenomenological self

C.3.2.1. Ontological assumptions: object-typification and stereotypification

C.3.2.2. Axiological assumptions: evaluation, orientation

C.3.2.3. Logical-epistemical assumptions: beliefs and entailments

C.3.2.1.1. Attributes and features of the phenomenological self

(i) Continuity: The self is enduring. Individuality is not fleeting but a consistent, constant experience.

(ii) Development: The self's individuality and continuity may change, for there are breaks in the continuity, as well as degrees of self-consciousness about it. The self evolves both perceptibly and imperceptibly.

(iii) Degree of self-consciousness: The sense of self is marked by the degree of self-awareness. This self-awareness may be experienced in terms of a scale: deep-shallow, expanded-shrinking, etc

(iv) Unity and plurality: The self may be experienced as whole or fragmented, one or many.

Individuality and connectedness: The self can be experienced as separate, bounded, unique, independent; or as connected, dependent, interdependent; or else as inner-directed or as outer-directed.

(v) Visibility and effability: The self is not a tangible object, but rather something hidden, occurring inside. It only shows itself by means of outward signals, which tell of the movements inside. At the same time, it is communicable by means of embodied mental and cultural schematizations involving projective mappings from source domains of concrete experience onto target domains of abstract concepts;

(vi) Contents: The self is commonly thought of as a space or container. It contains inessive states, and generates internal events, such as: thoughts, beliefs, emotions, forces. There may be a functional locus for each of these, a center of functioning located in a part of the whole of self. Generally, the body acts as a container, and bodyparts may act as functional loci for different internal events: head, heart, liver, guts, blood, etc. Verbs of Possession together with a bodypart functional locus commonly express different behavioral, moral, emotional, cognitive traits: (e.g. Sp. 'Tiene la sangre caliente/ malas entrañas / mala leche / buen corazón / mala cabeza / cojones'). An alternative is inessive metonymization: e.g. 'Es un cara / cabezón / manitas'.

(vii) Border/Limits: The self is commonly thought of as an inner space with outer limits, or a container that can be filled or emptied. Hence metaphoric spatial schematizations emotion and cognition attributes such as:

- Spatiality and emotion (e.g. Sp. 'Le salió del alma'; 'Le entró pena'; 'Le vinieron ideas'; 'Se le han metido manías'; 'Me saca de quicio');
- Spatiality and mental ability (e.g. Sp. 'Hasta ahí no llego', Eng. 'That's beyond me; That's over my head').

(viii) Functional locus of centeredness: The self possesses different loci of function. Since the self is experienced both as unity and (functional) division, there must be a locus at which the main functions are located. There may also be an inner real self. Hence conceptual metonymies such as:

- Rationality (e.g. Sp. 'Tiene una cabeza bien puesta' [= S/he is level-headed];
- Morality and character (e.g. Sp. 'Tiene buen corazón' [= S/he is good-hearted].
- Emotion and affectivity (e.g. Sp. 'Tiene roto el corazón')

(ix) Depth and Strata: The self is a many-layered structure. It is also hierarchical. The self is not a shallow surface, but a space with depth (e.g. Sp. 'Tiene buen fondo' [= S/he is good-natured].

2.2. Synthetic-onomasiological and Analytic-semasiological Approaches

We will now present a sample exemplification of the model of derivation sketched out above. As noted above, we distinguish (a) an encoding-oriented process, which works from Conceptualization to Formulation; (b) a decoding-oriented process, which works from Formulation to Conceptualization. In the synthetic-onomasiological process, we begin with a possible conceptual pragmatic-discursive function, then we give the cognitive-cultural model(s) (together with the attendant ontological, epistemic, logical and axiological assumptions and entailments), and finally work out the predicative and expressive constructions realizing them. In the analytic-semasiological approach, we simply work out the cognitive-cultural models as well as the possible pragmatic-discursive functions underlying one or more related predications or expressions.

2.2.1. Synthetic-Onomasiological Exemplification

Let us imagine a dyadic conversation between two Spanish speakers whose main topic is an absent third person. Let us assume that at the conceptualizing level, one of the speakers chooses a pragmatic-discursive function consisting in the summative negative evaluation of the absent person's character, perhaps a summative character evaluation offered as an uptake following a critical remark made by one of the interlocutors about the absent person's somewhat less-than-normal behavior. We can refer to it as an other-self derogatory evaluative ascription (OSDEA). Let us assume further that this negative evaluative ascription involves an evaluation of the person's mental-behavioral capacity or ability. Whittled down to its essentials, to encode this function, the speaker first retrieves a representatio of the OSDEA, then selects, as the second stage of the conceptualization, a cognitive-cultural model serving as conceptual vehicle to convey his/her pragmatic evaluation. Let us assume this cognitive-cultural model selected is the following: the Self-as-Machine. Itemizing the above functions, we obtain the following propositional-representational model:

1. Cognitive-Pragmatic function: other-self derogatory evaluative ascription
2. Cognitive-Cultural model (individualist, technocratic culture):

The Self is a Machine

- A. Ontological and epistemic assumptions (belief-categories)
 - A.1. Outward behavior is an effect of inner causes and processes
 - A.2. Inner processes are mechanisms
 - A.3. The self has functional parts
 - A.4. The self's functional parts are driven by these mechanisms
 - A.5. The self's mind is machine-like
 - A.6. The locus of intelligent functions is the mind
- B. Epistemic and Axiological Entailments
 - B.1. Efficient mechanisms are driven by well-functioning parts
 - B.2. Machines are inefficient when parts do not function well or are missing
 - B.3. A well-functioning mind is an asset
 - B.4. An ill-functioning mind is problematic and unreliable

Next, at the formulation level, the speaker must choose a proposition-predicative format for encoding the selected cultural model for the pragmatic function of derogatory ascription. This format underlies a number of possible expressions. Obviously the speaker has at his/her disposal a number of formulation options (both systemic and idiosyncratic) to encode the above pragmatic and cognitive-cultural models and schemas. Possible encodings might be: "Su mente no funciona bien", " Su cabeza no funciona bien". In both cases the expression encodes several metaphoric and metonymic projections derived from the general cognitive-cultural model employed (THE SELF IS A MACHINE; THE MIND IS THE GOVERNOR OF THE SELF; THE MIND WORKS LIKE A MACHINE WITH PARTS; THE HEAD IS THE SEAT OF THE MIND) by activating the lexical predicate NEG-FUNCIONAR (BIEN). Associated lexical models can be mobilized here as well as alternative encoding options. For example, the lexical predicate CARBURAR may be activated thus encoding another, more specific projection: "No le carbura la cabeza" (THE MOTOR ENGINE MODEL OF THE MIND). An alternative lexico-grammatical (idiomatic) expression might be: "Le falta un tornillo" [= S/he is missing a screw = S/he has a screw loose]. Here the speaker chooses a high-level negative-possessive propositional predication (NO TENER ALGUIEN ALGO), encoded in the lexical-predicate predicate FALTAR; we can abstractly capture this by means of the following Functional-Lexematic representation (Martín Mingorance, 1990b:100ff):

NEG-POSSESSIVE PREDICATION::FALTAR [(X1:<concreto>
(x1)EntityPos (x2: <concreto>: Object)EntityAff]State

This idiomatic expression encapsulates a metaphoric displacement made possible by the cognitive-cultural schematization THE MIND IS A MACHINE (and its attendant corollary assumptions and entailments detailed above: A MACHINE HAS PARTS; SOME PARTS ARE SCREWS, etc). The cultural model exemplified by this idiomatic expression entails a metaphoric mapping of the conceptual schema 'loss of function by loss of mechanical part' onto the conceptual schema 'handicapped mental process/ability'. In the mapping, the ontological, epistemological and logical structural assumptions of one domain are transposed to the other domain.

Throughout this discussion of the synthetic-onomasiological representation and derivation process, it can be inferred that there exists a mutually constraining relationship between the conceptualization level of the model and the formulation level. If the selected pragmatic function underlying the cultural model involves 'negative ascription', and, at the same time, the cultural model encodes the mental schema the mind is a machine (or machine-like), these choices are likely to constrain the type of predication format (type of state of affairs and types of entities involved) and expression encoding at the formulation level.

A further synthetic specification would spell out all the alternatives available in the repertoire of predications and expressions for a given pragmatic function and mental schematic function. Besides a repertoire of free grammatical expressions, there is a number of set phrases and expressions, idiomatic and proverbial expressions, or quasi-syntactic formulas available to the speaker in the cultural-linguistic repertoire, (eg. for the above cultural-cognitive model, cfr. Sp. "No le funcionan las neuronas", "Tiene el disco duro estropeado", "Es de piñón fijo, etc.). Whatever the choice, the selection of linguistic means can be seen as a secondary, subservient step in the derivation, following the selection of the cultural model. On this view, the cultural models provide a higher-order cognitive-cultural repertoire constraining the lexical-predicative selection of predications and expressions. The higher-order conceptualization mapping constrains the selection of lower-order predications (and their attendant selection processes of predicates and terms from the lexicon and the grammar).

However, a consideration is in order. Although the impression may have been given, that the model proposed to explain ascription of self properties to someone works mechanically and algorithmically, actually this is far from being the case. Speakers are involved in constant meaning-construction creative processes, and they also make use in meaningful interaction of the culturally-constituted public semantic resources existing in the language to convey certain pragmatic functions. Actually, most speakers probably engage in both types of meaning-construction processes. When speakers create their own private metaphorizations and conceptualizations, discourse models of language and thought may take over from predicative ones. In such narratological textual meaning-creation processes, speakers must be aware of the relevance, retrievability and shareability conditions of their own private metaphoric mappings (Shen, 1992; Clark, 1992). Other types of special-purpose discourse evolve their own discursive metaphoric projections, which may be highly idiosyncratic, or highly expert-oriented.

The synthetic-onomasiological approach allows us to compare different models of categorization of properties of the self. Consider, for instance the 'in/out' and 'up/down' containment and orientation schemas discussed in the cognitive linguistic literature (cfr. Johnson, 1987). According to Johnson, there are five entailments following from the in-out orientation schemata (1987:22):

- The experience of containment involves protection from, or resistance to, external forces.
- Containment also limits and restricts forces within the container.
- The contained object becomes fixed in location because of the restraint of forces
- The contained object becomes either accessible or inaccessible to the view of some observer.
- Transitivity of containment.

Such entailments can be encoded in Spanish by means of expressions such as 'Está encerrado en sí mismo'; 'Se siente atrapado'; 'Es una persona muy abierta'; 'Es muy cerrado de mollera'. At the same time, the existence in English and Spanish of inessive expressions involving predicative attributes such as 'salido', 'descentrado', 'spaced out', etc., reveals that in both languages the conceptualization of abnormal or less-than-normal states of mind (generally involving mental and emotive states and processes) relies equally on the mapping of embodied spatial and

orientation metaphoric projections. An embodied schema is a schematic structure that is constantly operating in our perception, bodily movement through space, and physical manipulation of objects (Johnson, 1987:23). In the in-out orientation schema, the within category is in the (by default) appropriate container. Thus, the logical structure of this categorization includes the entailment that the without or outside category is the negation of the within one. In the folk model of self, this means that going beyond the boundaries of the bounds of the category entails going out of the normality parameter and into the abnormality one. The abnormality parameter also has an outskirts and a core. The distance between the within category and the without category may be longer or shorter; and the orientational trajectory higher or lower.

From our standpoint, these schemas serve as conceptual vehicles for the conveyance of conceptual meanings involving a hierarchy of normality as well as a polarization between good and bad states of mind. The in/out schema represents the terms of a dichotomous spatial polarization between a positive conception of self, defined as a space or territory inside of which there is normality (unmarked) and a negative conception of self, defined as the state resulting from leaving the normality space or territory (marked). Thus, we have:

I. (Positive Pole): Inside: States of Normality

II. (Negative Pole): Outside: State of Abnormality: Deviancy, Impairment, Impersonality, Non-personality, Extraordinariness. Such terms as those belonging to the outside pole typically seem to convey states referring to, or describing personality traits involving sensory deprivation, special bodily and mental states, ill-health, sexual conduct, madness, mental or physical excess, overexertion, excitement, and the like. In Spanish expressions conveying this metaphor typically contain forms of verbs of motion like: *ir*, *salir*, *perder*, *escapar*, *volar* (eg. '*Perdió la cabeza*'; '*Se te escapa la cabeza*'; '*Está ido/volado/salido*').

We offer an interpretation of the cognitive-cultural model underlying the in-out schematic projections for Normal/Abnormal states of mind:

Cognitive-cultural assumptions:

A) Main assumption: An abnormal state of mind is the result of a movement from a normal state

B) Epistemic assumptions:

The original state is naturalness, normality.

This state is the starting space or enclosure.

This space entails a primary natural limit.

The end state is unnaturalness, abnormality.

This state is the end space or enclosure or lack of space or enclosure.

This space entails a non-primary limit.

C) Axiological assumptions:

The outside states are not good or desirable (subject to evaluation, criticism, acceptance).

The outside states are more or less dangerous or unacceptable and hence have undesirable consequences (subject to control, restraint, punishment, rejection, etc.).

For its part, the much-studied 'up/down' schema represents the terms of a vertical conceptualization of polarized metaphoric concepts:

1. Positive: UP IS HAPPY/GOOD (good feelings, good states of mind)

2. Negative: DOWN IS SAD/BAD (bad feelings, bad states of mind) as manifested in examples like Sp. 'Está por los suelos', 'Cayó en la depresión', 'Se ha rebajado', 'Está hundido', 'Éstá en la gloria', etc.

But there may exist other alternative spatial projections. One such type is the 'attachment/detachment' schema, combined with orientation and containment schemas. One variant of this schema includes the conceptual dimension 'solid bottom ground', in which the positive term of the polarized dichotomy encapsulates concepts of solidity concerning moral stances and ethical behavior, at least in Spanish, as evinced by examples like 'Tiene buen fondo', 'Es incommovable', 'Es de moral sólida'. Another variant includes the schema 'detachment from right centredness', which is found in expressions such as Sp. 'Estar desquiciado' (akin to Eng. 'To be unhinged'), or its causative counterpart, 'Sacar de quicio (= Eng. drive crazy).

As a rule, it seems to us that in Spanish the tendency is for the in/out schema to realize the normality/abnormality scale, and the up/down one to realize the good states of mind/bad states of mind polarized dichotomy. If so, we might construe the difference between the following two expressions:

(a) Está en una nube

(b) Está en las nubes

in the following way. Whereas (b) usually refers to someone who simply is unaware of something happening (i.e. someone who is in an (abnormal) state of mental muddle or confusion), (a) means "to be in a state of bliss, joy". Thus, (a) seems to belong to the up/down schema, but (b) to the in/out schema.

2.2.2 A Note on the Analytic-Semasiological Approach

Due to lack of space we are unable to offer a detailed exemplification of the analytic-semasiological approach; one or two instances will perhaps suffice to illustrate its import. One of the functions of this approach is the study of the decoding process: working out the models and functions underlying expressions. Another function is the study of the differential co-relation between Conceptualization and Formulation, in particular, the deambiguation of polysemic expressions. With the analytic semasiological approach we can analyze the cultural models and cognitive schemas shared by a given predication/expression as a polysemous encoding device. Take for instance the ambiguous Spanish inessive expression, 'Es muy corto'. Used as an ascription of personality trait (rather than, say, a 'description of a person's height), this expression is in fact ambiguous between several readings. The semasiological analysis allows us to derive the different models implied by the dimensional spatial predicate 'corto':

1. CORTO-1: 'corto de mente' [= not very clever, sharp].
Metaphoric Association: Spatial Dimension and Mental Ability;
2. CORTO-2: 'corto de miras' [= having modest aspirations, goals]. Metaphoric Association: Spatial Dimension and Depth of Vision.
3. CORTO-3: 'corto de trato' [= shy, not good at socializing].
Metaphoric Association: Spatial Dimension and Social Distance.

Hence the same spatial mental schema and predicative ascription can be used for different cognitive-cultural functions. Again, one could further taxonomize contrastively the spatial-dimensional conception of self implied by these expressions with regard to other spatial conceptions making use of alternative models, such as the spatial-containment schema: cfr. Sp. 'Está que no cabe en su cuerpo de gozo', 'Está llena de alegría', 'Se siente vacío', etc. Here the ascriptions make reference to positive and negative emotive states of mind, pointing to a view of the self as container, and of emotions as fluids or substances filling in, overflowing or emptying out of the container.

3. Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have presented a programmatic study of the categorization of self in Spanish, and less focally in English, emphasizing its representation and derivation from a cognitive-cultural point of view. More particularly, we have offered a classification of some of the dimensions, parameters, attributes and features involved in the representation of the category, and then proposed a model for the derivation of expressions, distinguishing between an encoding-oriented synthetic approach from a decoding-oriented analytic one. We have started from the cognitive anthropological assumption that, as calimed by Shweder and Bourne, "the metaphors by which people live and the world views to which they subscribe mediate the relationship between what one thinks and how one thinks [...] The way a culture's world view and master metaphors per se influence the relationship between what one thinks about an how one thinks" (1984:159). This signifies that, from a cognitive-cultural perspective, cultures live by metaphors and world-premises that direct their attention and affect to particular systems, relationally conceived and contextually appraised. The concept of self, therefore, provides an interesting comparative domain from which to draw a possible ratio of universalist vs. relativist tendencies in cultural meaning systems, in particular, the investigation of what the way we talk about ourselves or others, tells us about how and what we think of them, and hence, about what our way of thinking-talking is like, and, further, what it all reveals about our cognitive and axiological orientations and styles, our style of communicating, conceptualizing, reasoning strategies, etc. Admittedly, the latter goals are totally beyond the scope of this article. We have only attempted to offer some general ways in which we can approach the study of how the concept of self (revealed in our ways of describing, ascribing and referring to persons, their cognitive, emotive and behavioral traits, characteristics, etc.) is represented in Spanish and, less focally, in English, as a first approximation towards a more elaborated cultural-cognitive account of the concept of self from which one may derive further applications and implications (for instance, a cross-cultural cognitive ethnography of English-speaking and Spanish-speaking cultures).

On this vein, we may advance the tentative hypothesis that the conceptual mappings involving source and target domains to represent attributes of self are sensitive to a metaphorization hierarchy made up of

values implicit in the individualistic-collectivistic cultural-psychological dimension. That is to say, collectivistic (traditional) cultures, which emphasize public-self and in-group values over private-self and out-group values will tend to show a higher incidence of cognitive-cultural-linguistic mappings involving the dimensions of nature, animals, etc in the conceptualization of behavioral, mental, and emotive traits, or in the description of functional parts of self, and the location of functional centers, etc. (Cfr. naturalization, animation, reification expressions like Sp. 'Es un volcán' (emotion: deep); 'Trabaja como un mulo' (ability: endurance of hardships); 'Se comporta como un cerdo' (manners: shockingly rude); 'Es un corderito' (character: mild); 'Es un lince' (mental functioning: clever); 'Quien a buen árbol se arrima buena sombra le cobija (exemplary emulation). On the other hand, individualistic (modern, technocratic) cultures tend to favor machines, artifacts (cfr. Sp. 'Está hecho una chatarra', 'Es un robot', 'Es una máquina', 'Está muy revolucionado', 'Le falta un chip', etc.), and at the same time are more liable to be receptive to expert models: cfr., for instance, nowadays-common-psychoanalytic terms like 'repressed', 'neurotic', or even textual ones like 'el yo y sus circunstancias' coined by the philosopher Ortega y Gasset. Typical also of experts' models is the existence of topological creations, an example of which is the so-called 'self-help therapeutic' discourse, where one finds expressions like: "You must get rid of your inner custodian to get in touch with your real self" (from Gail Sheeey's best-selling book, *Passages: Predictable crises in adult life*. 1974). In this text we are dealing with an expert (a therapist's) cultural model of self with a number of special assumptions following from it about self-realization and self-healing philosophy, and a number of orientational, spatial and ontological metaphors serving as the linguistic-conceptual vehicles of expression, such as the self as sacred inner space rescued from usurped inner space.

If the above hypothesis bears up, one might expect more ambivalence and change in the cognitive-cultural metaphoric projections of the categorization of self in Spanish-speaking cultures, as they may be said to be in the process of undergoing a change from a collectivist to an individualistic culture.

Finally, it goes without saying that a more in-depth and comprehensive study of the categorization of self from a universalist and a cross-semantic standpoint would necessarily require the inclusion of a historical-diachronic dimension or what Rorty (1989) refers to as "changes of vocabulary" in the "metanarrative structure" of cultures.

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